Bostrom assumes in this argument that it is possible to simulate our minds using computer processes and our simulators have developed high-level technologies to do so efficiently.

He came up with the following three propositions and says we should accept at least one as true. Firstly, it is unlikely humans can survive to be technologically capable of building simulations. Secondly, no such advanced civilisation will want to run simulations of us. Lastly, we are highly likely to be simulated.

He explains that if the first two propositions do not hold, the number of simulated minds would exceed non-stimulated minds astronomically, proving the third preposition true as almost all minds would be simulated. He concludes that when humans become capable of running stimulations, it is highly affirmative that our minds are simulated as the first two propositions will be proved wrong, leaving the last proposition true.

One problem with Bostrom’s argument is that advanced computer programming is assumed to be sufficient to create consciousness, which Searle do not agree as he established that no programming is sufficient to create casual powers equivalent to that of the brain.1 This challenges the validity of Bostrom’s argument as his preliminary assumptions might not hold.

(200 words)

1. Rapaport, W. J. & Searle, J. Minds, Brains and Science. *Noûs* **22,** 585 (1988).